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AI ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ! ΘΕΩΡΙΑΙ TOY THOMAS HOBBES KAI TOY
the political theories
of
BARUCH SPINOZA. 'Η μελέτη αύτή τοϋ κ. ’Εμμανουήλ E. 
Μάρκογλου, έπϊ σειράν έτών Καθηγητοϋ των Πολιτικών 
’Επιστημών εις τό Πανεπιστήμιον Fairleigh Dickinson τών 
'Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών, αποτελεί συμβολήν εις τον κλάδον τών 
πολιτικών θεωριών, τής πολιτικής έπιστήμης, καί, είδικώτερον, 
εις τήν ερευνάν καί τήν μελέτην τών πολιτικών Ιδεών του 
Που αίώνος.'Ο συγγραφεύς εις τήν έργασίαν του αυτήν ανα­
πτύσσει τάς έπιρροάς τής προγενεστέρας πολιτικής σκέψε- 
ως έπί τών ιδεών τού Hobbes καί τοϋ Spinoza, άναλύει τάς από­
ψεις τάς όποιας οί δύο αύτοΐ πολιτικοί φιλόσοφοι ανέπτυξαν 
διά τήν έννοιαν τής δικαιοσύνης, τής έλευθερίας, τής άξιοπρε- 
πείας τοϋ άτόμου καί τής δημοκρατίας, προσδιορίζει δέ τά 
κοινά σημεία τών απόψεων των, ώς καί τήν συμβολήν των 
εις τήν διαμόρφωσιν τής πολιτικής σκέψεως τής έποχής των.
Thomas Hobbes and
I. INTRODUCTION
Baruch Spinoza Spinoza’s personality «appeared to his contemporar­
ies, as it has often since appeared to readers, remote 
and even obscure. Of all the great seventeenth century 
philosophers, Spinoza’s life and the sources of his
by
Emmanuel E. Marcoglou
Ph.D.
thought are least known».1 Indeed, until quite recent­
ly, his writings were almost unknown in Greece.
This is surprising, for history can present few 
personalities more remarkable than this philosopher 
of Amsterdam. On the other hand he was a sensitive 
man who avoided notoriety, whose main works 
appeared after his death, and, even then, were publish­
ed anonymously. Also, the manner of his writings 
was such as not to invite popularity. He shocked his 
contemporaries in many ways. All men in the seven­
teenth century had convictions which were insepara­
ble from their anthropomorphic conception of God. 
When Spinoza tried to substitute this with the notion 
of necessary and eternal law, he was accused of 
monstrous impiety. Even friends of his, like Leibnitz, 
spoke of him with consistent depreciation. Through­
out the century which followed his death, the scope 
and importance of his philosophical contribution were 
grossly underestimated and misapprehended.
Only Hobbes, an older contemporary of Spinoza, 
almost as great a thinker, suffered as much under the 
obloquy of supposed atheism. Hobbes’s principles 
were accused of being «pernicious both to piety and 
policy, and destructive to all relations of mankind, 
between prince and subject, father and child, master 
and servant, husband and wife; and... they who main­
tain them obstinately, are fitter to live in hollow 
trees among wild beasts, than in Christian or polit­
ical society. So God bless us».2 This was Bishop Bram- 
hall’s opinion.
The intention of this study is to present an analysis
1. Rosalie Colie, «Spinoza and the Early English Deists», 
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XX (January, 1959), p.23.
2. Thomas Hobbes, The English Works. Edited by Sir 
William Molesworth. 11 Vols. (London: John Bohn, 1839- 
1845), Vol.V, p. 25.
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of the political theories of Thomas Hobbes and Baruch 
Spinoza. A new analysis of those theories has become 
necessary as a result of the new knowledge which 
has been gained during the last decades, in the area 
of political thought.
It is a fact that Hobbes tried to establish his politi­
cal philosophy on modern natural science. This cannot 
be traced back to one or other of his predecessors. 
He was the first who looked for, and found, a new 
science of man and state. He examined and re-exam­
ined with sincerity, clarity and depth, the ideal of 
civilization in its modern form, and the ideal both of 
the socialist movement and the bourgeois-capitalist 
development.
It was Hobbes’s moral philosophy which influ­
enced Kant, Rousseau, and Hegel. And his political 
philosophy is of great importance for modern philos­
ophy, if the elucidation and discussion of the ideal 
of life is the decisive and primary task of philosophy. 
Its universal importance, however, cannot but remain 
unrecognized as long as the method is thought of as 
the determining feature of his politics. The moral 
attitude, which supports his political philosophy, is 
«pre-scientific» in the sense that it is independent of 
the foundation of modern science. This moral atti­
tude finds its sincerest and fullest expression in Hob­
bes’s political philosophy. Hobbes’s Levathian, espe­
cially, is considered a classic of English literature. It 
was recognized as a powerful document for the times 
and also as a permanent contribution to moral and 
political philosophy.
Hobbes created a strong sovereign, but no authori­
tarian monster. His sovereign, like everybody, was 
afraid of death, and tried to satisfy his subjects’ 
needs in order to avoid this end. The state’s actions 
were to be limited. In this, Hobbes may have been the 
first liberal. The state was powerful, but only to 
secure order and security, not for self-glorification. 
The sovereign could not control man’s private beliefs; 
his attention was confined to the outward behavior 
of man. And an individual could, as an ultimate 
weapon, resist if his life were in danger, for the 
sovereign would not be performing the function for 
which he existed.
Hobbes did not subscribe to the idea of a general 
good which was the object of men’s desires. He did 
not accept the Aristotelian concept of man’s social 
nature. From its individual, atomistic parts he had 
constructed an absolutist state. He had not allowed 
the sovereign to be in anyway restrained by natural 
law. He had tried to dispose of any theological justi­
fication of power. To answer him became a major 
preoccupation of succeeding writers. His influence 
faded, but it was restored with the Utilitarians in 
the nineteenth century.
A similar thesis, with variations, was elaborated
by Spinoza. He, like Hobbes, demonstrated how men 
could be made to live in peace, in spite of enmity and 
instability; how men, «even when led by passion, may 
still have fixed and stable laws». The study of power 
was the key to the understanding of society and poli­
tics. The state resulted from human efforts to escape 
the condition of war, and to seek self-preservation. 
Thus a contract created a sovereign power. But men 
were not to surrender all their rights and become 
sheep. The good sovereign looked after the interest of 
all his subjects, and did his best to obtain «a union or 
agreement of minds». The ruler was powerful but he 
was limited by the fear he felt of his subjects.
According to Spinoza, God was equated with uni­
versal nature, and natural right with the power of 
nature. Spinoza emphasized, more than Hobbes, the 
importance of reason. Therefore, a political organi­
zation should allow a citizen the freest possible use 
of his reason. A proper state guaranteed not only secu­
rity but intellectual freedom. As there was a need 
for enlightened and well-informed citizens, opinion 
would not be suppressed. An enlightened man would 
have a better understanding of his conditions and 
would not be at the mercy of his emotions.
Spinoza advocated religious freedom, separation of 
church and state, and toleration. He was very much 
against religious superstition and intolerance. These 
ideas were received with a torrent of abuse from 
theologians and their allies. But many poets and im­
aginative writers found themselves among his adher­
ents. Goethe, Lessing, Auerbach and Heine studied 
him and admired him. This is not surprising as there 
is about Spinoza a charm and a power, which strong­
ly appeal to the poetic sense. His friends, however, 
were intellectual friends who were also attracted by 
the strength of his character.
Spinoza was really the first political philosopher 
of modern times to declare himself openly a democrat. 
This was not so because he idealized the people. It 
was not a question of a mystic faith in the common 
man. Spinoza was a democrat because he had come 
to the conclusion that the democratic way of life 
was the best to assure the liberty of man. This was 
indeed a landmark in political thinking.
II. THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS HOBBES
Thomas Hobbes was born in England, in the village 
of Westport, near Malmesbury, in Wiltshire, on 
April 5, 1588. He had a happy boyhood in Malmes­
bury. His father was a friendly, semi-educated vicar 
who was, later, to lose his position for striking a 
parson. Thus, the boy was brought up with the finan­
cial help of his uncle, Francis, who was well-to-do, and
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who sent him to grammar school and later to Oxford.
He studied Latin and Greek, under Robert Latimer, 
and, after he entered Magdalen-hall in Oxford, at 
fourteen, geography and astronomy. Many years later 
his enemies charged that he had not read enough.1 
To this he answered that if he had read as much as 
the others, he could not have known more than they 
did.1 2 The truth was, Hobbes was very well read. But 
he did not want to offer evidence of his reading as 
he did not like to accept the past uncritically. «Though 
I reverence those men of ancient time», he wrote, «that 
either have written truth perspicuously, or set us 
in a better way to find it out ourselves; yet to the 
antiquity itself I think nothing due. For if we will 
reverence the age, the present is the oldest.»3 After 
receiving his bachelor’s degree he became, in 1608, a 
tutor to the son of William Cavendish, Baron Hard­
wick, who was to become the first Earl of Devonshire. 
This was an important milestone in his life as it spar­
ed him the poverty which was the usual lot of the 
tutors in his century.4 Thanks to his connection with 
the Cavendish family, which lasted all his life, he 
was able to meet people like Lucius Cary, Lord Falk­
land, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and Ben Jonson. 
Chatsworth, the Cavendish family estate, was to him 
a better university than Oxford.5
Hobbes was rather a friend than a tutor to his 
pupil, who was only three years younger than he 
was, seventeen when their association started, though 
already married (to a twelve-year-old Scottish heiress 
who, however, did not take up her marital duties for 
a few years).6 In 1610 he and his pupil, who was 
actually a bachelor, visited Italy and France together 
to study foreign languages. After their return Hobbes 
gave himself completely to the study of the classical 
historians. Thus, he was able, in 1629, to publish 
his first work, a translation of Thucydides’ Pelopon­
nesian War. Shortly before he had served for a while 
as secretary to Francis Bacon.
In 1628 Cavendish, Hobbes’s friend and student, 
died as a result of his «excessive indulgence in good
1. Edward, Earl of Clarendon, A Brief View and Survey 
of the Dangerous and Pernicious Errors to Church and State, 
in Mr. Hobbes’s Book Entitled Levathian. 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Printed at the Theatre, 1676), Epistle Dedicatory.
2. John Aubrey, «Brief Lives», chiefly of contemporaries 
set down by John Aubrey between the years 1669 and 1696. 
Edited by Andrew Clark. 2 Vols. (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press, 1898), p. 349.
3. Thomas Hobbes, Levathian or the Matter, Forme and 
Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil. Edited 
by Michael Oakeshott. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), p. 467.
4. JohnEachard, The Grounds andOccasions of the Contempt 
of the Clergy and Religion Enquired into (London: Printed by 
W. Godbid for N. Brooke at the Angel in Cornhill, 1670), passim.
5. Hobbes, The English Works, op. cit., Vili, IV.
6. Francis Bickley, The Cavendish Family (Boston:
Hougthon Mifflin, 1914), p. 41.
living».7 Hobbes accepted a position as a cicerone to 
the son of Sir Gervase Clinton with whom he visited 
France and Switzerland. He was now forty years old. 
It was at this time that he discovered Euclid when he 
saw a copy of his in a Geneva library.8 Geometry 
infatuated Hobbes with its unity, logical structure 
and «beauty» which, according to Matthew Arnold, 
a born scientist can apply even to the most unprom­
ising subject matter.9 Algebra, on the other hand, 
did not make the same impression at all on him. Hob­
bes was suspicious of all efforts to «arithmetize» 
geometry.10 Algebra was, for him, a minor branch of 
arithmetic, «to the theory whereof two or three Days 
at most are required, though to the Promptitude of 
Working, perhaps the Practice of three Months is 
necessary».11 Actually, Hobbes greatly underesti­
mated the importance of algebra. His ignorance of 
algebra—and calculus—led him to an argument with 
the great mathematician, of his time, John Wallis.12
In 1630, Hobbes went back to the Cavendish family 
as tutor to the young son of the Earl of Devonshire. 
With his student he went again (his third trip) to 
Europe. In Pisa he had many meetings with Galileo 
whom he remembered with respect all his life.13
It is at this time, after his return to England, that 
his political interests assert themselves. In 1640 he 
wrote two books, De Corpore Politico, or the Ele­
ments of Law, and Humane Nature; or the Fundamen­
tal Elements of Policic. Both were published in 1650, 
having previously circulated in manuscript. Also, in 
1640, and as Parliament was to assume power, he 
thought it expedient to go to France, just in case that 
his monarchical ideas could be used, by his opponents, 
as a reason to persecute him. He remained in France 
for eleven years. While in Paris he published De Cive, 
in 1642. He also entered into a controversy with 
Descartes. Their differences were fundamental. Des­
cartes accepted spirit as real but wanted to separate 
it from matter, while Hobbes wanted to banish it 
from the universe.
Hobbes also entered into a controversy with John 
Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, who attacked him for
7. Ibid., p. 43.
8. G. R. De Beer, «Some Letters of Thomas Hobbes», 
Notes and Becords of the Boyal Society, VII (April 1950), 
p. 205.
9. Matthew Arnold, «Literature and Science», Discourses 
in America (London, 1885), p. 113.
10. Thomas Hobbes, Seven Philosophical Problems (1662), 
in Works, op. cit., VII, pp. 67-8.
11. Thomas Hobbes, Rosetum Geometrum (1671), trans­
lated by Venterus Mandey as Book II of MellificiumMensionis 
(4th ed., London, 1727), p. 125.
12. G. Udney Yule, «John Wallis, D.D., F.R.S.: 1616-1703», 
Notes and Records of the Royal Society, II (1939), pp. 74-82.
13. Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, «De Cor­
pore», Works, op. cit., I, Vili. Ferdinand Tönnies seems also 
to believe that Galileo had had great influence on Hobbes.
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what he considered the free thought and impiety of 
Levathian.
In 1645 Hobbes was appointed tutor in mathemat­
ics to the Prince of Wales, who was living in Paris, 
as an exile. This aroused fears that Hobbes could 
prove to be a bad influence. Robert Baillie wrote from 
Scotland that, «the placeing of Hopes [Hobbes] (a 
professed Atheist, as they speak) about the Prince as 
his teacher, is ill taken. .. Let such wicked men be 
put from about him».1 The fears, however, proved 
completely unfounded. The Prince, who became Char­
les II, did not give any indications of being under 
Hobbes’s influence, except, perhaps, in his love and 
interest in science. Indeed, in 1652, after Hobbes’s 
Levathian came out in 1651, Charles as a result of 
the general dissatisfaction, which the book created, 
asked Hobbes to leave the Court, and the sixty-four 
years old philosopher went back to England.
Back in London continued his studies in geometry 
and lived in semi-retirement at the Cavendish estate, 
in Derbyshire. After the Restoration the King, undis­
turbed by the rumours about Hobbes’s «atheism», 
awarded him a pension of one hundred pounds a year.
In the later part of his life, Hobbes produced a 
Latin translation of the Levathian, which was publish­
ed in Amsterdam, in 1670. He also distinguished 
himself by becoming, in a way, the founder of a 
school of psychological literary criticism. «To Hob­
bes», wrote Professor Thorpe, «more than to any 
other single Englishman, later criticism may be said 
to have owed its distrust for tradition and dogma and 
its gradual return to the spirit of Aristotle in basing 
its judgements on a close study of works of literature 
and on an analysis of facts in relation to literature.»1 2 
Indeed, Hobbes’s style is ironical, witty, and didac­
tic. His ideas have coherence and unity, and, his 
system has order. And, as Professors Wellek and 
Warren, the theoreticians of literature, have pointed 
out, «every work of art imposes an order, an organ­
ization, a unity on its material».3 Hobbes, himself, 
had this to say about it, «If you will be a philosopher 
in good earnest, let your reason move upon the deep 
of your own cogitations and experience; those things 
that lie in confusion must be set asunder, distinguish­
ed and every one stamped with its own name set 
in order; that is to say, your method must resemble 
that of the creation.»4
Hobbes was faithful to this method. «The Leva-
1. Robert Baillie, The letters and Journals of Rober 
Baillie. Edited by David Laing. 3 Vols. (Edinborough [sic]: 
The Bannatyne Club, 1841-1842), II, pp. 388, 395.
2. Clarence De Witt Thorpe, Aesthetic Theory of Thomas 
Hobbes. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1940), p. 8.
3. Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature. 
(London, 1949), p. 14.
4. Hobbes, Works, op. cit., I, XIII.
thian», Michael Oakeshott declares, «is a myth, the 
transposition of an abstract argument into the world 
of the imagination. In it we are made aware at a 
glance of the fixed and simple centre of a universe of 
complex and changing relationships. The argument 
may not be the better for this transposition, and what 
it gains in vividness it may pay for in illusion. But 
it is an accomplishment of art that Hobbes, in the his­
tory of political philosophy, shares only with Plato.»5
As an old man, Hobbes decided to return to the 
classics. When he was eighty he translated, in Eng­
lish verse, the Odyssey and the Iliad. Why and how 
did he decide to do so? «Because», he says, in his 
preface, «I had nothing else to do. Why publish it? 
Because I thought it might take off my adversaries 
from showing their folly upon my more serious 
writings, and set them upon my verses to show their 
wisdom. But why without annotations? Because I had 
no hope to do it better than it had already been done 
by Mr. Ogilby.»6 The translations were not received 
well in some quarters. John Dryden wrote that Hob­
bes studied poetry, «as he did mathematics, when it 
was too late».7
During his old age Hobbes spent almost all of 
his time with the Cavendishes, at their estate. He 
meditated and read. He smoked moderately and drank 
very little. Like Spinoza he was a bachelor.
Hobbes died in 1679 at age ninety-one. According 
to a legend he wished that his tomb would bear this 
inscription: «Here is the true philosopher’s stone». 
Instead his tomb bears this epitaph, written by himself, 
«Vir probus, et fama eruditionis Domi forisque bene 
cognitus».8
Even individuals who opposed him all his life 
like Clarendon and Ross gave him credit for his eru­
dition and character. He knew intimately such people 
as Cowley, Waller, Cassendi, Harvey, Petty, Pell, 
Seiden and Mersenne. Harrington, not an admirer of 
Hobbes’s politics, complimented him as a man who 
«is and will in all future ages be accounted the best 
writer at this day in the world».9 Most of these men 
disagreed with either his political theories or his re­
ligious beliefs or with both. But they all agreed that 
Thomas Hobbes was one of the great philosophers of 
his era.
5. Michael Oakeshott, Introduction, Levathian, op. cit., 
p. XVIII.
6. Hobbes, Works, op. cit., X, X.
7. John Dryden, Fables Ancient and Modern (London: 
Printed for Jacob Tonson at Shakespear’s Head over — 
against Katherine Street in the Strand, 1713), «Preface», 
sig. A3v.
8. Aubrey, op. cit., I, p. 386.
9. James Harrington, The Common-wealth of Oceana 
(London: Printed by J. Streeter for Livewell Chapman, 
1656), p. 259..
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III. THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF 
BARUCH SPINOZA
Baruch Spinoza was born in Amsterdam, in 1632, 
into a Jewish community of Sephardics. The members 
of the community had lost most of their traditions, 
continuing to be Jewish more, perhaps, because they 
were called so than for any other reason.1
Spinoza lived within this little society, of about one 
thousand peolpe, until he was twenty.1 2 He was taught 
Hebrew in the community school but his native 
tongue was Spanish.3 He learned enough Dutch to be 
able to speak with his Christian friends and also ac­
quired Latin, «the language of priests and scholars». 
Although as a child he had received religious training, 
his outlook and character indicate that he felt as a 
European.
Baruch Spinoza was excommunicated from his com­
munity on July 27, 1656, when he was twenty-four 
years old. Amsterdam’s Rabbi Isaac de Fonseca 
Aboab expelled him from his fellow Jews with these 
words:
The chiefs of the council do you to wit, that having long 
known the evil opinions and works of Baruch de Spinoza, 
they have endeavored by divers ways and promises to with­
draw him from his evil ways, and they are unable to find a 
remedy, but on the contrary have had every day more knowl­
edge of the abominable heresies practiced and taught by him, 
and of other enormities committed by him, and have of this 
many trustworthy witnesses who have deposed and borne 
witness in the presence of the said Espinoza, and by whom 
he stood convicted...
With the judgement of the angels and of the saints we ex­
communicate, cut off, curse and anathematize Baruch de Spinoza, 
with the consent of the elders and of all this holy congregation, 
... with the anathema wherewith Joshua cursed Jericho, with 
the curse which Elisha laid upon the children, and with all 
the curses which are written in the law. Cursed be he by day 
and cursed be he by night. Cursed be he in sleeping and cursed 
be he in waking,... The Lord shall not pardon him, ..., The 
Lord shall destroy his name under the sun, ...
And we warn you, that none may speak with him by word 
of mouth, nor by writing, nor show any favor to him, nor be 
under one roof with him, nor come within four cubits of him, 
nor read any paper composed or written by him.4
What was the real reason that made the Amsterdam 
Jewish elders excommunicate Spinoza? Was it that 
his liberalism offended their orthodoxy? Or, perhaps, 
they sensed in him the new social forces which were 
developing the mind of a man who would become the 
first revolutionary Jewish intellectual? In any case
1. Bernard H. M. Vlekke, Evolution of the Dutch Nation 
(New York: Roy Publishers, 1945), p. 186.
2. C. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire (New York: 
Knopf, 1965), p. 129.
3. A. Wolf, The Correspondence of Spinoza (New York: 
Dial Press, 1927), p. 407.
4. Sir Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philos­
ophy (2nd ed., London, 1899), pp. 17-8.
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after his excommunication, Spinoza had nothing to 
do with the Jewish community. His social, economic, 
and political ideas were opposed to them. They were 
conservative while he was a republican who, at the 
same time, advocated the dissolution of the important 
trading companies. He was against monopolies. The 
elders could not tolerate radical political and economic 
ideas nor theological disagreements. They were afraid 
of him and their act of excommunicating him resulted 
from their bewilderment and fear.
After his excommunication, in 1656, and until his 
death, in 1677, he lived within the Christian communi­
ty, but he never joined any religious group nor was 
he assimilated to the secular Dutch people. He devot­
ed his time composing his philosophy and making 
a modest living polishing lenses. His life was com­
pletely in agreement with the ethical ideal of his own 
philosophy. He lived according to his own moral 
standards.5
Baruch’s father had allowed him, at the age of 
eighteen, to study Latin, under Professor Van den 
Ende. He proved to be a good student. All his out­
standing works were written in Latin which, although 
not elegant, was adequate. Van den Ende actually 
had started him on a new life by introducing him to 
the works of Galileo, Copernicus, Harvey, Kepler, 
and Descartes. Spinoza worked within the philos­
ophical traditions of his time, but was able to trans­
form them completely; yet according to their own 
rules.6 The Calvinists who were, potentially, danger­
ous to him could not understand his Latin, and thus 
could not make a case against him. And as he did 
not try to become leader of a school, nobody could be 
persecuted in his name.7 Yet, before his excommuni­
cation, the Jewish authorities had tried to stop him, 
as much as they could. Realizing that he did not make 
enough polishing lenses they had offered him 1,000 
florins annually if he would desert Van den Ende 
and stay in their communion. As he had never been 
interested in money he turned them down. Many 
years later, he wrote in The Ethics that, «the free 
man who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far 
as he can, to avoid receiving favors from them».8
Still, it is a fact that at his time the Netherlands 
tolerated more the practice of unorthodox ideas than 
any other European nation.9 Radical writers who
5. Jean Luckas, «The Life of the Late Mr. De Spinoza», in 
The Oldest Biography of Spinoza. Edited by A. Wolf (London 
Allen and Unwin, 1927), pp. 59, 64.
6. Leon Roth, Spinoza, Descartes and Maimonides (New 
York: Russell and Russell, 1963), p. 56.
7. Wolf, op. cit., p. 479.
8. The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, Translated 
from the Latin with an introduction by R. H. M. Elwes, 
Volumes I and II bound as one (Dover Publications, Inc., 
New York, 1951), Vol. II, p. 234.
9. Wolf, op. cit. Ep. 7, p. 100.
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could not print their books elsewhere did so there.1 
Also, Spinoza could rely on the influence of some 
powerful friends, members of the ruling class. They 
were not, exactly, his followers, but he and they were 
in agreement about so many things that many writers 
have formed the opinion that he was the political 
theorist of the party supporting Jan De Witt, the 
man who ruled de facto the country from 1653 to 
1672.
Spinoza published, under his own name, only one 
book, on the philosophy of Descartes. His Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus came out, anonymously, in 1670. 
The Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatiotie, the Ethics 
and the Tractatus Politicus were all published in 1677, 
the year of his death, and after he died. The Ethics 
and the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, how­
ever, had been completed many years before. Spi­
noza’s fame during the second part of the seventeenth 
century, and throughout the eighteenth, was entirely 
based on the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.1 2 It had 
very wide circulation and influenced, greatly, the En­
lightenment.3 The book came out in an underground 
edition, under the imprint of a fictitious publisher. 
It created a storm. He was classified, together with 
Hobbes, as an «atheist». Although Spinoza had many 
secret disciples, nobody of importance wanted to be 
publicly identified with his doctrines.4 John Locke, 
for example, who was quite familiar with the doc­
trines of both Hobbes and Spinoza, and who knew well 
the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, turned against 
Spinoza, pretending that he hardly knew the book. 
This is what he considered expedient to write, «I am 
not so well read in Hobbes or Spinoza as to be able 
to say what were their opinions in this matter. But 
possibly there be those who will think your lordship’s 
authority of more use to them in the case than those 
justly decried names . . ,»5 Leibnitz, who knew Spi­
noza personally, often denied that he did so. Even 
Hume, who adhered to his principles,6 referred to 
Spinoza as «that famous atheist».7 Kant did not read 
the Ethics, in spite of its impact on German idealism.8 
After this period it is not possible to measure the in­
fluence of Spinoza. In Germany, Nietzsche, among
1. Ibid., Ep. 68, p. 334; Ep. 70, p. 339.
2. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 179.
3. Paul Hazard, The European Mind (Cleveland: World 
Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 139, 144-50.
4. Robert A. Duff, Spinoza’s Political and Ethical Philos­
ophy (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1903), p. 8.
5. The Works of John Locke (London: Thomas Tegg 
1823), IV, p. 477.
6. Duff, op. cit., p. 8.
7. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited 
by L. A. Sebby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 241.
8. Hubertus Gezinus Hubbeling, Spinoza’s Methodology
(N.V. Groningen: Van Gorsum and Co., 1964), p. 1.
others, acknowledges it.9 In England, during the first 
half of the nineteenth century, many Spinozists ap­
peared. Among them were Shelley, George Eliot, 
Byron, Coleridge, and Wordsworth.10
Because of his emphasis on psychic determinism, 
Spinoza has been considered as the father of psycho­
analysis.11 But it cannot be said that he is, in any 
direct way, the founder of modern psychology.
On February 16, 1673, he was offered the post of 
Professor of Philosophy, at the University of Heidel­
berg. This is the letter sent to him in the name of 
the Elector Palatine:
Most renowned Sir, His Most Serene Highness the Elector 
Palatine, my most gracious master, commands me to write 
to you, who are, as yet unknown to me, but most favorably 
regarded by his Most Serene Highness, and to inquire of you, 
whether you are willing to accept an ordinary professorship 
of Philosophy in his illustrious University. An annual salary 
would be paid to you, equal to that enjoyed at present by the 
ordinary professors. You will hardly find elsewhere a prince 
more favorable to distinguished talents, among which he 
reckons yourself. You will have the most ample freedom in 
philosophical teaching, which the prince is confident you will 
not misuse, to disturb the religion publicly established. I 
cannot refrain from seconding the prince’s injuction. 1, there­
fore, most earnestly beg you to reply as soon as possible, 
and to address your answer either under cover to the Most 
Serene Elector’s resident at the Hague, Mr.' Grotius, or to 
Mr. Gilles Van der Hele, so that it may come in the packet 
of letters usually sent to the court, or else to avail yourself 
of some other convenient opportunity for transmitting it. 
I will only add, that if you come here, you will live pleasantly 
a life worthy of a philosopher, unless events turn out quite 
contrary to our expectation and hope. So farewell. 1 remain, 
illustrious Sir, Your devoted admirer, I. Lewis Fabritious. 
Professor of the Academy of Heidelberg, and Councillor of 
the Elector Palatine.12
Heidelberg was one of the most outstanding univer­
sities of Europe and the offer, to the son of a Por- 
tuguese-Jewish refugee, very flattering. But Spinoza 
did not miss the meaning of the reference to «the reli­
gion publicly established». The implication was clear. 
This was his answer:
Distinguished Sir, If I had ever desired to take a professor­
ship in any faculty, I could not have wished for any other than 
which is offered to me, through you, by his Most Serene 
Highness the Elector Palatine, especially because of that free­
dom in philosophical teaching, which the most gracious prince 
is kind enough to grant, not to speak of the desire which I 
have long entertained, to live under the rule of a prince, whom 
all men admire for his wisdom.
9. Walter A. Kaufman, Nietzsche (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1950), p. 116.
10. Lore Metzger, «Coleridge’s Vindication of Spinoza», 
Journal of the History of Ideas (April 1960, Vol. XXI), pp. 
279-93.
11. Robert Waelder, «Psychic Determinism and the Pos­
sibility of Prediction», Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. XXXII, 
No. 1 (1963), p. 15.
12. Spinoza, Works, op. cit., pp. 373-4.
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But since it has never been my wish to teach in public, 
I have been unable to induce myself to accept this splendid 
opportunity, though I have long deliberated about it. I think, 
in the first place, that I should abandon philosophical research 
if I consented to find time for teaching young students. I think, 
in the second place, that I do not know the limits, within which 
the freedom of my philosophical teaching would be confined, 
if I am to avoid all appearance of disturbing the publicly es­
tablished religion. Religious quarrels do not arise so much 
from ardent zeal for religion, as from men’s various disposi­
tions and love of contradiction, which causes them to habitually 
distort and condemn everything, however rightly it may have 
been said. I have experienced these results in my private and 
secluded station, how much more should I have to gear them 
after my elevation to this post of honor.
Thus, you see, distinguished Sir, that I am not holding 
back in the hope if getting something better, but through my 
love of quietness, which I think I can in some measure secure, 
if I keep away from lecturing in public.1
A few years before, in 1667, a friend of Spinoza, 
Simon de Vries, had died remembering him in his 
will and leaving him 500 florins a year. The sum was 
not a large one. But Spinoza stated that he did not 
need it all and accepted only 300 florins which in­
sisted that covered all his needs. Apparently this was 
not so and he was soon obliged to move to cheaper 
quarters. He also saved money by preparing his own 
meals. He lived in an attic chamber while he contin­
ued to work at his trade.
Having made his position clear on politics and 
theology, Spinoza came back to the Ethics, the great 
work of his life. When he finished it, in 1675, he added 
this comment:
I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching 
the mind’s power over the emotions and the mind’s freedom. 
Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how 
much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by 
his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various 
ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acqui­
escence of his spirit, but moreover lives, asit were unwitting of 
himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases 
to suffer, ceases also to be.
Whereas, the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, 
is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of 
himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal neces­
sity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence 
of his spirit.
If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result 
seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. 
Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found.How would 
it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could 
without great labour be found, that it should be by almost all 
men neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they 
are rare.1 2
All of a sudden he made up his mind not to publish 
the book. These are his reasons as they are mentioned 
in a letter addressed to his friend Oldenburg:
Distinguished and illustrious Sir, When I received your 
letter of the 22nd July, I had set out to Amsterdam for the 
purpose of publishing the book I had mentioned to you. While
1. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 374-5.
2. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 270-1.
I was negotiating, a rumour gained currency that I had in the 
press a book concerning God, wherein I endeavoured to show 
that there is no God. This report is believed by many. Hence 
certain theologians, perhaps the authors of the rumour, took 
occasion to complain of me before the prince and the magis­
trates; moreover, the stupid Cartesians, being suspected of 
favouring me, endeavoured to remove the aspersion by abusing 
everywhere my opinions and writings, a course which they 
still pursue. When I became aware of this through trustworthy 
men, who also assured me that the theologians were every­
where lying in wait for me, I determined to put off publishing 
till I saw how things were going, and proposed to inform you 
of my intentions. But matters seem to get worse and worse, 
and I am still uncertain what to do.
Meanwhile I do not like to delay any longer answering 
your letter. I will first thank you heartily for your friendly 
warning, which I should be glad to have further explained, 
so that I may know, which are the doctrines which seem to 
you to be aimed against the practice of religion and virtue. 
If principles agree with reason, they are, I take it, also most 
serviceable to virtue. Further, if it be not troubling you too 
much I beg you to point out the passages in the Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus which are objected to by the learned, 
for I want to illustrate that treatise with notes, and to remove 
if possible, the prejudices conceived against it. Farewell.3
On Saturday, February 21, 1677, Baruch Spinoza 
died at the age of 44. He had been a man who had 
thought it right that a philosopher should remain 
concealed, impassively, behind his philosophy, and, 
like his great ancestors, Lucretius and Euclid, he 
had concealed, effectively, himself behind his work. 
Radical in his economics, politics and associations, he 
became the founder of the philosophy of liberalism.
IV. THE POLITICAL THEORIES 
OF HOBBES
Five main ideas characterize Hobbes’s political philos­
ophy: (1) the idea of moving away from monarchy 
as the most natural form of state, to the idea of 
monarchy as the most perfect artificial state; (2) the 
idea of moving away from the recognition of natural 
obligation on the basis of law, morality, and the 
state, to the deduction of law, morality, and the 
state from a natural claim; (3) the idea of moving 
away from the recognition of a superhuman authority 
—whether of a natural order based on divine reason 
or a revelation based on divine will; (4) the idea 
of moving away from the study of past and present 
states to the free construction of the future state; 
and (5) the idea of moving away from the principle 
of honor, to the principle of fear of violent death. 
Hobbes’s philosophy is exactly this homogeneous 
connection among the final stages of the ideas men­
tioned. His fundamental opinion was that fear, or 
more precisely fear of death, was the power which 
made men clear-sighted, and vanity the force which 
made men blind.
3. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 296-7.
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His political science was applied to at least three 
sorts of phenomena: (1) law; (2) religion; (3) history.
Law. According to Hobbes, the law of a state is 
the command of the ruler to the subjects, «CIVIL 
LAW, Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the 
Commonwealth hath Commanded him, by Word, 
writing or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make 
use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; 
that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not 
contrary to the Rule.»1
Hobbes sees the ruler as the absolute source of 
law in the state. Within the state, there are no laws 
that are not the ruler’s laws. Thus, what is not 
authorized by the sovereign is of no importance. 
It is, therefore, a logical conclusion that the opinions 
of lawyers, the decisions of judges, the interpretations 
of divine or natural law, the orders of subordinate 
assemblies, are only law if they are approved as 
such by the ruler.
Hobbes offers an explanation of law which clari­
fies the legal structure of the state; his political 
science shows that all law-making and law-enforcing 
agencies derive their jurisdictions and powers from 
the sovereign. This, politically, amounts to an attack 
on the supporters of Parliament and on the common- 
law position, as at the start of the Civil War every­
body accepted the idea that the King in Parliament 
was sovereign.1 2 The office of the King was abolished 
in 1649 when England became a Republic.3
Religion. Hobbes tries to explain the phenomena 
of religion as he explains the phenomena of law. 
The ruler, whether Christian or not, regulates re­
ligious opinion and public worship. All established 
religion has its force not jure divino but jure civili. 
Men are free to believe what they want in the privacy 
of their minds, as long as they obey the sovereign’s 
commands. Christianity requires only a simple 
belief in Christ and obedience to the sovereign; the 
other faiths are only methods used by ambitious 
clerics to exploit believers and enhance their power.4 
As religion became more and more the source of 
social disturbances after 1640, Hobbes spent more 
and more time against religious fanaticism.5
History. Hobbes makes also an effort to explain 
the phenomena of history. This is a more important 
test of his political philosophy than his explanations 
of law and religion. Like the phenomena of nature, 
the phenomena of history occur in sequence in time. 
What we would like to have is a causal explanation
1. Hobbes, Levathian, op. cit., p. 203.
2. J.H.M. Salmon, The French Religious Wars in English 
Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 81-8.
3. S.R.Gardiner, ed.,ConslitutionalDocuments of the Pur­
itan Revolution, 1628-60. (Oxford: Clar. Press, 1889),pp.291-7.
4. Hobbes, Levathian, op. cit., pp.214-27.
5. Ibid., pp. 286-546.
of the sequences of events. And this is what Hobbes 
ought to give us, according to his own principles.
Some people believe that all knowledge is empirical. 
But Hobbes disagrees, «this», he says, «is an error; 
for these signs are but conjectural; and according 
as they have often or seldom failed, so their as­
surance is more or less; but never full and evident; 
for though a man hath always seen the day and 
night to follow one another hitherto; yet can he not 
thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have 
done so eternally. Experience concludeth nothing 
universally. If the signs hit twenty times for once 
missing, a man may lay a wager of twenty to one of 
the event; but may not conclude it for a truth».6 
Knowledge of phenomena can be provided from ob­
servation and experience, but causal knowledge can 
be provided by science alone.7
Students of Hobbes’s political philosophy have 
also paid special attention to his obvious anti- 
aristocratic prejudices. It is a fact that he explicitly 
denied that one man’s blood was better than an­
other’s,8 and refuted the peerage’s claims to be 
regarded as the natural counsellors of the King. 
«Good counsel comes not by lot, nor by inherit­
ance.»9 He was also afraid that justice could be 
perverted by the influence of the powerful and the 
rich. He condemned the existence of private armies 
and superfluous retainers,10 and did not accept the 
idea that the misdemeanours of the great should be 
treated more leniently than those of the ordinary 
people. On the contrary, for, «the violences, oppres­
sions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but 
aggravated by the greatness of their persons».11
His hostility to the nobility, however, should not 
be exaggerated. His attacks were, actually, against 
the relics of feudalism, which was decaying in mid­
seventeenth century. Unlike Spinoza, Hobbes did 
not urge the abolition of nobility and, often, his 
attitude to the House of Lords was not unsympathet­
ic. Even more striking were the concessions he made 
to the old aristocratic code. Not only did he favor 
titles of honor;12 he was even prepared to elevate 
a man’s concern for his reputation into a natural 
right, so that a man could refuge to execute a shame­
ful act if another could do it without incurring igno­
miny. Indeed, under certain conditions, a man could 
refuge to fight, personally, for his sovereign:
Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a soldier 
to fight against the enemy, though his sovereign have right
6. Hobbes, Elements of Law, op. cit., (I. iv. 10), p. 16.
7. Ibid., pp. 1-14, passim.
8. Ibid., p. 68.
9. Hobbes, English Works, op. cit., Ill, p. 340.
10. Ibid., Ill, p. 224.
11. Ibid., Ill, p. 333.
12. Hobbes, English Works, op. cit., Ill, p. 167.
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enough to punish his refusal with death, may nevertheless in 
many cases refuse, without unjustice; as when he substituteth 
a sufficient soldier in his place... And there is allowance to 
be made for natural timorousness... When armies fight, there 
is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it 
not out of treachery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it 
unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoid 
battle, is not injustice, but cowardice. But he that inrolleth 
himself a soldier, or taketh imprest money, taketh away the 
excuse of a timorous nature;... And when the defence of the 
commonwealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able 
to bear arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the 
institution of the commonwealth, which they have not the pur­
pose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.1
It is obvious here that Hobbes considers the words 
of the covenant as allowing some rights in the sub­
ject to refuse to conform to his sovereign’s orders.
There was one sphere, however, where Hobbes 
disapproved completely of the aristocratic cult. 
This was the institution of dueling which had only 
taken root in England during the later sixteenth 
century.1 2 Hobbes rejected dueling, as «a custom not 
many years since begun» that «a gallant man, and 
one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take 
notice of».3 He claimed that only men who did not 
have sufficient faith in themselves reacted to an insult 
with a duel invitation.4
Hobbes is an anti-aristocratic royalist. He believes 
that the sovereign has the duty to preserve his own 
power and the necessary rights for the full exercise 
of sovereignty. It is his duty to see that his subjects 
recognize those rights.5 The sovereign must defend 
his subjects from foreign and domestic dangers and 
to do so he must maintain proper military forces, 
and he must have the financial means to pay for these 
services. He will avoid unnecessary wars6 but will 
fight if necessary. He will forestall attempts at rebel­
lion by watching over political factions and doctrines.7
The sovereign has also the right to commit his 
subjects to the religion of his choice:
And forasmuch as eternal is better than temporal good 
it is evident, that they who are in sovereign authority, are by 
the law of nature obliged to further the establishing of all 
such doctrines and rule, and the commanding of all such 
actions, as in their conscience they believe to be the true way 
thereunto.8
It is also the sovereign’s duty to pass laws leading 
to the increase of wealth—to encourage manufactures, 
fishing and husbandry and to discourage idleness.
1. Ibid., Ill, p. 205.
2. Sir G. Clark, War and society in the seventeenth 
century (Cambridge, 1958), chapter 2.
3. Hobbes, English Works, op. cit., Ill, p. 286.
4. Ibid., Ill, p. 295.
5. Ibid., Ill, pp. 323-32.
6. Ibid., IV, p. 220.
7. Ibid., IV, pp. 216-20.
8. Ibid., IV, p. 214.
This does not mean, however, that Hobbes was in 
favor of laissez-faire economics. On the contrary he 
ruled that while the idle and strong should be made 
to work, the state should provide for the weak 
and poor.9
The sovereign must consider it his duty to apply 
rewards and punishments. Hobbes considers punish­
ment as part of natural law that in revenges, men 
should not look at the greatness of the evil past, 
but at the greatness of the good to follow.10 The 
purpose, therefore, must not be revenge, but some 
social good, including correction either of others 
by the offender’s example or of the offender himself. 
The most severe punishment should be for crimes 
dangerous to the public. Crimes which result from 
fear, need or infirmity, should be treated with more 
lenience. Finally, the sovereign must select good 
advisers and public officers and see that the judges 
are honest men. When the judges are corrupt, this 
can, «... put wicked men in hope to pass unpunish­
ed», and «honest subjects encompassed with mur­
derers, thieves, and knaves, will not have the liberty 
to converse freely with each other, nor scarce to 
stir abroad without hazard;... »u
A further consideration should be given, perhaps, 
to the authority of the civil sovereign. A theory in 
which all legal authority is traced to his commands 
invites questions such as these: Is the sovereign to 
legalize his own position?, or Is the supreme author­
ity to authorize itself?, or Is the original exercise 
of authority, an exercise of power rather than author­
ity? It may be observed that so far as the sovereign’s 
authority is concerned, it is explained by Hobbes 
as deriving neither from sovereign command nor 
from civil law, but by the citizens themselves who, 
directly or indirectly, authorize the sovereign’s ac­
tions. Thus, and because of the above, Hobbes may 
be able to say that ultimately all forms of govern­
ment are democratic. According to him political 
authority is not absolute. It is for and over some 
person, and it exists where that person has author­
ized it or for so much as he has done so. In dealing 
with this question, Hobbes continues:
Which power and right of commanding, consists in this, 
that each citizen hath conveyed all his strength and power to 
that man or council; which to have done, because no man 
can transfer his power in a natural manner, is nothing else 
than to have parted with his right of resisting.12
Hobbes refuses, therefore, to allow that political 
power can be concentrated this way, when he is
9. Ibid., Ill, p. 334.
10. J. Laird, Hobbes (London, 1934), pp. 221-3.
11. Hobbes, De Corpore Politico, English Works, op. 
cit., IV, pp. 217-8.
12. Hobbes, De Cive, English Works, op. cit., II, p. 70.
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directly considering the point. Even the most auto­
cratic ruler must depend upon the co-operation of 
at least his police force, and the strength of men can 
be of value only if their minds and wills are brought 
to conformity with the commands which are issued 
to them. Hobbes knows this very well, and considers 
throughout political power as a problem of submis­
sion of the human will.
I assive resistance by the subject should prove 
ins fficient for the maintainance of sovereign power, 
th nly solution, according to Hobbes, is an ex- 
pa on of the citizen’s responsibilities and obliga­
tio On this point he is very clear:
The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth 
to another, or others, the right of protecting and defending 
himself by his own power, is the security which he expecteth 
thereby, of protection and defence from those to whom he 
doth so relinquish it; and a man may then account himself 
in the estate of security, when he can foresee no violence to 
be done unto him, from which the doer may not be deterred 
by the power of that sovereign, to whom they have every 
one subjected themselves: and without that security, there is no 
reason for a man to deprive himself of his own advantages, 
and make himself a prey to others... How far therefore in the 
making of a commonwealth, man subjecteth his will to the 
power of others, must appear from the end, namely, security. 
For whatsoever is necessary to be by covenant transferred, 
for the attaining thereof, so much is transferred, or else every 
man is in his natural liberty to secure himself.1
Here Hobbes introduces a different kind of argu­
ment. At this point, whatsoever is necessary for 
securing the objective of the political covenant should 
be transferred to the sovereign authority. He enlarges 
this principle, so as to make it the citizen’s respon­
sibility to see that the purpose of the covenant is not 
frustrated. Indeed, he expands the citizen’s obliga­
tions to provide security and peace for the pre­
servation of human society.
In the final section of Levathian, Hobbes adds a 
further law of nature, «To the Laws of Nature... 
I would have this added, that every man is bound by 
nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in war the 
authority, by which he is himself protected in time 
of peaceo)'2. But, of course, the only thing that can be 
transferred by the political covenant is the right to 
resist, and Hobbes’s appeal to the objective of the 
covenant is, in a way, a recognition of its insuf­
ficiency.
Sovereign and people cannot be contestants in a 
controversy, because «the people» is either a multi­
tude of individuals or a political expression which 
takes for granted the exercise of sovereignty. Further­
more, disagreements between individual subjects and 1 2
1. Hobbes, De Corpore Politico, English Works, op. 
cit., IV, pp. 128-9.
2. Hobbes, Levathian, English Works, op. cit., Ill, p. 703.
the sovereign, cannot be taken as a special case of 
disagreements among the subjects themselves. Be­
cause in the former case, who is to judge and who 
will offer a satisfactory interpretation of law so 
that the problem may find a solution?
Hobbes can only reply, to those who object to 
this conclusion, that the exercise of sovereignty is a 
necessary condition of society, and that the existence 
of an agent outside the framework of civil law is 
a necessary condition of sovereignty. To those who 
would consider this unattractive for society, Hobbes 
explains that the power of sovereignty is not as harm 
fui as civil war,3 and, besides, we have no choice·
And whosoever thinking sovereign power too great, will 
seek to make it less, must subject himself, to the power, that 
can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.4
V. THE POLITICAL THEORIES 
OF SPINOZA
The medieval ideal of feudalism and European unity 
under the Roman papacy, had been destroyed, by 
the rise of national monarchies and the growth of 
urban industries. The seventeenth century was 
coming to its end, and the clergy and landed aristo­
cracy were loosing ground as the princes and city 
burghers were acquiring new political importance. 
The kings of Spain, France, and England, were 
establishing royal despotisms, based on Roman law 
and the Justinian dictum that the king’s will had legal 
force. At the same time, the new class of merchants 
and manufacturers, who had accumulated wealth 
and demanded participation in the government of 
their countries, were serving as a check against abso­
lutism.
The persecution of the Protestants by Catholic 
Spain, in the Netherlands, and Spanish interference 
in Dutch domestic policies, together with several 
other factors, had led to revolts and, finally, to the 
establishment of an independent republic. This 
proved particularly conducive to political thought, 
as the Dutch intellectuals were trying to justify their 
new independence, by collecting all the arguments 
necessary to answer the followers of absolute monar­
chy and those who idealized the temporal authority 
of the Popes.
It was, at this time, Spinoza who established the 
doctrines of human equality, of popular sovereignty 
and of the general or common will of the people. 
He had tried to secure freedom of thought and ex­
pression and, if he had lived longer, he would have 
probably become as known for his contribution in
3. Ibid., p. 170
4. Ibid., Ill, p. 195.
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the development of modern political science as he 
was in metaphysics.
Spinoza and Hobbes often use the same terminol­
ogy. Several of their expressions, such as state of 
nature, civil and natural right, give the impression 
of a similar approach to political phenomena. But 
this is not true. Hobbes, a materialist long before 
Karl Marx, afraid of the chaos produced by human 
fallibility, was ready to surrender individual liberty 
to a great extent, to achieve mutual security for the 
human race.
Spinoza was as familiar as Hobbes with the dan­
gers inherent in an undisciplined democracy. He 
was also afraid of anarchy:
The fickle disposition of the multitude, almost reduces those 
who have experience of it to despair, for it is governed solely 
by emotions, not by reason: it rushes head-long into every 
enterprise, and is easily corrupted either by avarice or luxury: 
everyone thinks himself omnisciet and wishes to fashion all 
things to his liking, judging a thing to be just or unjust, lawful 
or unlawful, according as he thinks it will bring him profit 
or loss: vanity leads him to despise his equals, and refuse their 
guidance: envy of superior fame or fortune (for such gifts 
are never equally distributed) leads him to desire and rejoice 
in his neighbour’s downfall. I need not go through the whole 
list, everyone knows how much crime results from disgust 
at the present—desire for change,headlong anger, and con­
tempt for poverty—and how men’s minds are engrossed and 
kept in turmoil thereby.1
Spinoza did not disagree with Hobbes that the 
chief motivation of man is self-interest. But, unlike 
Hobbes, he never forgot the great compassion he 
always felt for the whole human race.
Like many other philosophers, Spinoza loves law 
and order. He does not like an artificial kind of order, 
or a universal empire in Dante’s style or a Platonic 
Republic. He likes what makes man mature and 
grow, and he dislikes what hinders him and destroys 
his growth and happiness. According to him, the 
raison d'être of the state is to make it possible for 
men to exist and spend their lives in peace and free­
dom, without endangering the lives and freedom of 
others. He strongly believes in a citizen army, with 
every citizen having the privilege to keep arms in 
his home. He favors local government responsibility 
and home rule, not governmental centralism. In 
all his writings he repeats again and again that he 
prefers the insecurity of freedom to the security of 
bondage.
What happens though if men, being weak, refuge 
to follow logic and reason and turn against the 
survival and stability of the state? What happens if 
men create dictatorships to enslave their fellow- 
citizens? Spinoza, unlike Locke who justified revolu­
1. Spinoza, Works, op. cit., I, pp. 216-7.
tion, does not believe in it. This is what he writes:
He that knows himself to be upright does not fear the death 
of a criminal, and shrinks from no punishment; his mind is no 
wrung with remorse for any disgraceful deed: he holds that 
death in a good cause is no punishment, but an honour, and 
that death for freedom is glory.2
Spinoza believes that the dictator, will, in the end, 
be responsible for his own downfall, that the in­
evitable consequence will be revolution, and that, 
eventually, the dictatorship is bound to crash.
Spinoza’s purpose was to convince people to 
think rationally and realistically about political prob­
lems, without being influenced by religious and moral 
prejudices. He recommends a scientific method for 
rational men, rather than showing how the ordinary 
man arrives at political decisions. It is a fact that most 
men do not have an objective and clear understanding 
of the laws governing human behavior. Indeed, most 
men’s lives are governed by passive emotion. And 
it is this passive emotion which leads them into 
conflict with other men.
The rational man, in order to control his human 
environment, will study society and will accept the 
fact that governments seek the extension of their 
own dominion and power. This being so, he will 
try to show the ruling authority the stupidity of 
turning its citizens into enemies by oppressing 
them, and, at the same time, will try to show the 
citizens the folly of risking anarchy for the sake of 
minor extra liberties. Spinoza was not a Machiavel­
lian, although he respected Machiavelli for his govern­
ment technique, written in a scientific and secular 
spirit. But Machiavelli had thought of obtaining and 
preserving state-power as an end in itself. This idea 
was what made Machiavelli so significant an inter­
preter for twentieth-century political movements. 
But Spinoza, a scholarly and individualistic man, 
was very remote from sixteenth-century Italy and 
the game of politics for politics’ sake. For Spinoza, 
the art and science of government were only a means 
to an end, the end being the comperative freedom and 
security of the rational man. Machiavelli sees the 
citizen as government’s raw material for manufac­
turing state-power. He sees only the government’s 
point of view. Spinoza, on the other hand, writes 
always from the point of view of the individual, for 
whom government and society are just indispensable 
means to freedom. It is from this point of view that 
he examines the various types of political organiza­
tion—aristocracy, monarchy and democracy; which 
system is more likely to benefit the important individ­
ual liberties? which system is more likely to produce
2. Ibid., I, p. 263.
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the best combination of organization, order, and free­
dom? Spinoza is searching for the answers:
Therefore, on applying my mind to politics, I have resolved 
to demonstrate by a certain and undoubted course of argument, 
or to deduce from the very condition of human nature, not 
what is new and unheard of, but only such things as agree 
best with practice. And that I might investigate the subject- 
matter of this science with the same freedom of spirit as we 
generally use in mathematics, I have laboured carefully, not 
to mock, lament, or execrate, but to understand human ac­
tions;...
And so it comes to pass, that, as all are equally eager to 
be first, they fäll to strife, and do their utmost mutually to 
oppress one another; and he who comes out conqueror is 
more proud of the harm he has done to the other, than of the 
good he has done to himself. And although all are persuaded, 
that religion, on the contrary, teaches every man to love his 
neighbor as himself, that is to defend another’s right just 
as much as his own, yet we showed that this persuasion has 
too little power over the passions...
We showed, too, that reason can, indeed, do much to 
restrain and moderate the passions, but we saw, at the same 
time, that the road, which reason herself points out, is very 
steep, so that such as persuade themselves, that the multitude 
of men distracted by politics can ever be induced to live ac­
cording to the bare dictate of reason, must be dreaming of 
the poetic golden age, or of a stage-play.1
Spinoza’s general philosophy led him to the point 
that it is reasonable for the individual citizen to 
sacrifice some of his lesser interests and liberties, 
to achieve a satisfactory government and social 
structure which, in turn, will guarantee security and 
the intellectual freedom of the citizens. If people 
obey a government which is not acting in their in­
terest, they are slaves; but an authority or a govern­
ment which is concerned to guarantee the intellectual 
freedom and the physical safety of its subjects, is a 
legitimate authority. It is logical for free men to 
respect such a government, since it provides the 
necessary conditions of their happiness and freedom.
Spinoza, unlike Hobbes, would not have allowed any 
compromise with totalitarianism which would have 
limited freedom of opinion; he was the natural enemy 
of any government which would try to impose any 
doctrinal orthodoxy, secular or religious. After all 
men can be forced, by rewards or threats, to behave 
in certain ways, but cannot be made to believe. He 
outlines a theory which was to grow to full force 
in J. S. Mill’s On Liberty. This is Spinoza’s position:
He who seeks to regulate everything by law, is more likely 
to arouse vices than to reform them. It is best to grant what 
cannot be abolished, even though it be in itself harmful. How 
many evils sprang from luxury, envy, avarice, drunkenness, 
and the like, yet these are tolerated—vices as they are— 
because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments. How 
much more then should free thought be granted, seeing that 
it is in itself a virtue and that it cannot be crushed! Besides,
1. Ibid., I, pp. 287-9.
the evil results can easily be checked, as I will show, by the sec­
ular authorities, not to mention that such freedom is absolute­
ly necessary for progress in science and the liberal arts...2
A society which does not allow free thought, 
said Spinoza, «cannot be maintained without great 
peril to the state».3 More strongly:
The more the sovereign tries to deprive men of freedom 
of speech, the more stubbornly is it opposed; not indeed by 
money-grubbers, sycophants, and the rest of the shallow crew, 
whose supreme happiness is to gloat over the coins in their 
coffers and to have their bellies well-stuffed, but by those 
who, because of their culture, integrity, and ability, have some 
independence of mind.4
We know now that Spinoza, with his theories of 
the common or general will, of popular sovereignty, 
and of democracy in the modern sense, has led the 
way to the French Declaration of Human Rights 
and the American Revolution. We also know that 
his utilitarian concept of the state, forms—together 
with the writings of Bentham, Locke, and Thomas 
Jefferson—the basis of modern political life.
In his preface to the Theological-Political Treatise 
Spinoza makes it clear that the reason he wrote the 
book was to defend freedom of opinion. He shows 
clearly that public order is not only compatible with 
freedom of opinion, but that it is really incompatible 
with anything else.
John Locke, the outstanding philosopher of the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, was influenced by his 
ideas. When Locke arrived in Holland, in 1684, 
a fugitive from King James II, he made friends with 
Philipp Limborch and J. G. Graevius. Both men 
knew Spinoza well and were drawn to his liberal 
views.5 It was at this time that Locke wrote his 
Epistola de Tolerantia, in 1685.6 And when, in 
1689, wrote the creed for the «society of Pacific 
Christians», an organization he had formed with 
some of his friends, the ideals corresponded exactly 
to Spinoza’s principles.7
As Leibniz had foreseen, the ideas of Spinoza 
had contributed to the Revolution which was in the 
making. His philosophy was a hymn to freedom and 
the precursors of the French Revolution were deeply 
influenced by it. His work, however, suffered the
2. Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Chief Works, 
op. cit., pp. 261-3. (Elwes’s translation).
3. Ibid., pp. 261-2.
4. Benedict de Spinoza: The Political Works, edited and 
translated by A. G. Wernham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1958), Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, XX, pp. 235-7.
5. Lettres inédites de John Locke à ses amis Nicolas Thoy- 
nard, Philippe Van Limborch et Edward Clarke, ed. Henry 
Ollion and T. J. De Boer (La Haye, 1912), p. 217.
6. John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke's 
Works, (10th ed., London, 1801), VI, p. 52.
7. Ibid., pp. 185-6.
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fate of all classics; men quoted him more than they 
read him, so that Voltaire could say: «As for Spinoza, 
everybody talks of him and nobody reads him.» 
And as is the case with most revolutionary thinkers, 
many men tried to write competent refutations 
without even touching the great and profound truths 
which he had spoken for his time.1 But the fact 
remains that Spinoza’s extraordinary thinking helped 
to break the chains which the medieval method of 
thought had imposed on the human mind.
Even today, it is far from accidental that in coun­
tries which cherish the ideal of individual liberty, 
and allow freedom of thought, the material standard 
of livirg is much higher than in Franco’s Spain or 
within the orbit of the dictatorial Soviet Union. 
It is, also, far from accidental that governments 
which thwarted the creative initiative of their most 
gifted citizens have collapsed.
A society which isolates and destroys its most 
creative and imaginative thinkers, which demands 
orthodoxy and conformity, will be doomed, in the 
end, to the very mediocrity which it tries to impose 
on its own members.
VI. HOBBES AND SPINOZA
It is a practical necessity to discuss separately the 
common points and disagreements between the polit­
ical theories of the two thinkers.
First of all it must be stated that they both have 
a completely secular outlook. They both accept 
naturalistic ethics, radical individualism, egoistic 
psychology and the firm belief that the new physical 
sciences are relevant to the study of political ques­
tions. Both get from the study of human nature their 
political outlooks.1 2 And they both consider stability 
in government of primary importance.
Spinoza, however, assumes that Hobbes’s subject 
has given up his natural right as he enters civil 
society:
With regard to politics, the difference between Hobbes 
and me, about which you inquire, consists in this that I ever 
preserve the natural right intact so that the Supreme Power 
in a State has no more power over a subject than is propor­
tionate to the power by which it is superior to the subject. 
This is what always takes place in the state of nature...3
The individual’s right of nature does not cease in the political 
order. The fact is that man acts in accordance with the laws 
of his own nature and pursues his own advantage in both the 
nature and the political order.4
1. «Les Systèmes», Satires, in Oeuvres Complètes de 
Voltaire (Paris, 1877), X, p. 171.
2. Spinoza, Political Works, Tractatus Politicus, op. cit. 
I, par. 7 (Wernham’s translation); Hobbes, De Cive, English, 
IPor/fs, op. cit., p. 3.
3. Wolf, Correspondence, op. cit., Ep. 50, p. 269.
4. Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, op. cit., Ill, par. 3 (Wern­
ham’s translation).
It is an assumption which is in agreement with what 
Hobbes obviously wishes to say but does not do so 
clearly.
Hobbes and Spinoza seem to agree on the meaning 
of freedom. Hobbes stated, «Liberty, that we may 
define it, is nothing but an absence of the lets and 
hindrances of motion.»5 Spinoza wrote that a man is 
«free, in so far as he can repel all force, take what 
vengeance he pleases for harm done him, and, to 
speak generally, live as his own nature and judgement 
dictate».6 Both definitions seem to interpret freedom 
as the absence of external hindrance. Both agree that 
freedom is limited greatly as all human actions are 
determined by preceding states of affairs.
Spinoza, as well as Hobbes, deduces the necessities 
of political life from an understanding of human 
nature, but they do not seem to quite agree on what 
human nature is. Hobbes is excited by his wild 
comparison of the life of man to a race, a struggle 
with other men for advantage, «with no other goal, 
nor other garland, but being foremost».7 This strug­
gle is not just a matter of occupation; indeed, it is 
life itself, «to forsake the course, is to die».8 Hobbes 
believes that egoism takes always the form of com­
petition with others, a view not shared by Spinoza.9 
For Spinoza, man is not competitive but self-realizing, 
self-preserving, and this is achieved by moderating 
competition first, and, then, by working toward 
cooperation between men to everybody’s advantage. 
The difference is fundamental.
Hobbes and Spinoza are both political egalitarians, 
but Hobbes denies the possibility of important dif­
ferences among men. He believes that, wisdom is 
the result of experience only,10 and that even pru­
dence, «equal time, equally bestows on all men».11 
Hobbes, thus is a great «Leveier».
Hobbes and Spinoza consider the state as an 
artificial entity to improve the lives of men, and 
want it strong enough to be able to achieve that end. 
Both favor absolute sovereignty and Hobbes does 
not even accept the possibility of constitutional 
governments:
If it were possible there could be such a state, it would 
do whit advantage the liberty of the subject. For as long as 
they all agree, each single citizen is as much a subject as pos-
5. Hobbes, De Cive, English Works, op. cit., p. 109.
6. Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, op. cit., II, par. 9 (Wern­
ham’s translation).
7. Hobbes, English Works, op. cit., IV, pp. 52-3.
8. Ibid., p. 53.
9. Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, op. cit., Ill, 
p. 51; Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, op. cit., V, p. 93 (Wern­
ham’s translation).
10. Hobbes, De Cive, English Works, op. cit., p. 2 (The 
influence of Bacon, and of Bacon’s naive empiricism is more 
than evident here).
11. Hobbes, Levathian, op. cit., p. 80.
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sibly he can be: but if they disagree, the state returns to a civil 
war.1
Spinoza’s difference here from Hobbes is on under­
standing of political probability, and, of course, in 
this area, there can be no proof.1 2 However, English 
history, and, especially, the history of English govern­
ment, soon illustrated by example Hobbes’s «impos­
sible state»3 as it took its meaning out of Aristotle’s 
definition of man as a city-state animal.
Both Spinoza and Hobbes were influenced by 
Machiavelli but only Spinoza was able to grasp fully 
his concept of a national character. Also, Spinoza 
and Machiavelli faced the problem of the appearance 
of a social structure, with a theory of hero-founders. 
Spinoza adopts the classical, and Machiavellian,4 
concept of the hero-founder. Later, he developes, 
further, his history:
Human nature is such that men cannot live without some 
common system of law. Now such systems have been estab­
lished, and public affairs conducted, by men of great acuteness 
—call them astute or cunning as you please.5 6
Spinoza, however, unlike Rousseau or Machiavelli 
never considers the hero-founder as a possible re­
former; he considers him only as the creator of the 
national character.8
Hobbes had completed all his major books before 
Spinoza had made a name for himself. This is why 
his writings contain no reference to him. He did 
make one remark about him, however, which is 
significant. He said that «he durst not write so bold­
ly».7 This was referring to Spinoza’s writings on 
religion and politics and clearly indicates that Hobbes 
would have expressed similar opinions had he dared. 
Undoubtedly, Hobbes, the most important English 
political philosopher of his era, was a great man. 
But Spinoza (who died at 44 to Hobbes 91) was 
also a great man, a much more subtle commentator, 
and, I feel, a man with greater courage.
1. Hobbes, De Cive, English Works, op. cit., p. 125.
2. Spinoza, Tractalus Theologico-Politicus, op. cit., XVII, 
p. 163; pp. 187-9 (Wernham’s translation).
3. Sir Frederick Pollock, «Spinoza’s Political Doctrine 
with Special Regard to His Relation to English Publicists», 
in Chronicum Spinozarum, Vol. I (The Hague: The Spinoza 
Society, 1921), p. 57.
4. Niccolò Machiavelli, «The Prince», in The Prince 
and the Discourses of Machiavelli (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1940), VI, p. 21; The Discourses of Niccolò Machi­
avelli. Edited by Leslie J. Walker (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1950), I, 2, p. 211; 1,9, pp. 233-6; I, 17, p. 257.
5. Spinoza, Tractalus Politicus, op. cit., 1, par. 3 (Wern­
ham’s translation).
6. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (New 
York: Everyman Library, 1950), Book II, 7, pp. 37-42.
7. Aubrey, Brief Lives, op. cit., I, p. 357.
VII. THE MEANING OF HOBBES'S AND 
SPINOZA’S THEORIES FOR US
Hobbes and Spinoza taught us that man is, in the 
end, responsible for his own destiny and makes his 
own social institutions. Spinoza, especially, analyzed 
the human personality and made it clear that while we 
shall deal only with facts, avoiding wishful thinking, we 
should never lose faith in the future of the human race.
Both philosophers taught us that all our impulses 
can be useful in our ethical development, and that 
even «vices» can be directed to right and normal 
ends. And that the completeness of our personalities 
is the most compelling urge of life. But this can not 
be achieved by phantasies and day dreams. It can 
only be gained by the harmonious expression of all our 
vital forces and by our will toward self realization.
Naturally, as humans we are apt to make errors 
in judgment. But there is no instinct which could 
not be of value in the ethical growth of the race. 
And conscience can come to the world only if we 
give dignity to our lives. Without faith, man is like 
a ship without an anchor, like a straw in the wind. 
Only with dignity and faith we can see our existence 
as a phase of eternal life.
Individuals and nations must learn to live together. 
This, of course, can happen only if everybody be­
comes aware of the need for interdependence. And 
it implies the brotherhood of men, whatever their 
color, their creed, their race, their nationality, their 
language and their social status. Only this way 
Isaiah’s vision can become a reality:
And they shall beat their swords into plowshares
And their spears into pruning hooks,
Nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
Neither shall they learn war any more.
We, in the West, who consider liberty and equality 
the corner-stones of a democratic state, know that 
the road is slippery. The League of Nations failed 
in the past and the United Nations may fail in the 
future. But we must have faith in ourselves and we 
must believe in the eventual victory of rationality:
In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be 
feared: for it is almost impossible that the majority of a people, 
especially if it be a large one, should agree in an irrational 
design: and moreover, the basis and aim of a democracy is 
to avoid the desires as irrational, and to bring men as far as 
possible under the control of reason, so that they may live 
in peace and harmony: if this basis be removed the whole 
fabric falls to ruin.8
This, after all cannot be an easy life. We shall have 
a hard time of it to keep our minds open and to
8. Spinoza, Chief Works, op. cit., I, pp. 205-6 (Elwes’s 
translation).
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maintain our sense of beauty. Hobbes and Spinoza, 
especially Spinoza, searched for a way of life which 
harmonizes the activity and intelligence of individual 
man with his dignity. There is sadness in being 
a man, but it is a proud thing too.
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